Determinants of CEO Turnover in UK Non – Financial Firms: An Empirical Analysis

Authors

  • Samwel Marwa Werema Senior Lecturer, Institute of Accountancy Arusha, P. O. Box 2798, Arusha, Tanzania

Keywords:

CEO Turnover, Top Management Changes, Poor Performance, High Financial Leverage, Managerial Ownership, Corporate Control.

Abstract

This paper examines the determinants of CEO Turnover using a sample of UK non-financial firms that announced top management changes during 1993-2000. It is found that poor performance and high financial leverage preceded forced CEO Turnover, and there is no significant evidence that there was poor performance or high financial leverage prior to normal CEO Turnover. It is also found that managerial ownership is significantly negative related to the likelihood of forced CEO Turnover. There is also evidence that the market for corporate control plays a significant role in CEO Turnover.

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Published

2018-04-30

How to Cite

Werema, S. M. (2018). Determinants of CEO Turnover in UK Non – Financial Firms: An Empirical Analysis. International Journal of Sciences: Basic and Applied Research (IJSBAR), 38(2), 13–23. Retrieved from https://www.gssrr.org/index.php/JournalOfBasicAndApplied/article/view/8895

Issue

Vol. 38 No. 2 (2018)

Section

Articles

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